X-Ray Pumped Laser

[rickshaw]

Reagan and the proponents of SDI were very naive IMO, believing SDI would stabilise the international nuclear situation.

Was that ever the aim, though? I thought SDI was part of the "outspend the Soviets and ruin their economy" strategy, rather than a serious attempt at missile defence. Some of the ideas (the x-ray satellites included) were truly daft...

That was only part of the justification.  The Soviet economy was a wreck and basically had been since the mid-1950s.  It was really the spending on conventional defence which brought the whole crumbling edifice down, if anything.   The problem with SDI was that it had the potential to destabilise an already fragile balance.  I don't doubt Reagan genuinely believed it was a purely defensive system.  His comments after watching "The Day After" showed he was very naive about the effects of nuclear war.   They should have looked at it from the Soviet perspective.  They feared that it would be used to defend the US from the effects of the US launching a first strike against the fUSSR, effectively ensuring that any Soviet counter-strike would be defeated.   This would increase the already existing first strike imperative which existed in the strategic balance to the point where it would be impossible to resist.  Basically, the Soviets would need to strike first, before SDI was operational, otherwise their strategic defences would be rendered pointless at a single stroke.  So, rather than reinforcing or decreasing the "balance of terror", it would actually ratchet it up substantially.

Nuclear Strategy is, at the best of times a strange beast, full of numerous contradictions and twists and turns.  It used to send my head around the bend when I studied it.  It is very hard to explain it to others who don't understand the language and the nuances, who think in straight lines rather than wibbly-wobbly ones. 

[KJ_Lesnick]

Rickshaw

That was only part of the justification.  The Soviet economy was a wreck and basically had been since the mid-1950s.  It was really the spending on conventional defence which brought the whole crumbling edifice down, if anything.

Conventional defense brought them down?

The problem with SDI was that it had the potential to destabilise an already fragile balance.  I don't doubt Reagan genuinely believed it was a purely defensive system.

It would seem that he wanted to use it for that purpose, whether he realized it could be used offensively or not.  The Day After really screwed him up and showed him how flawed the mentality on nuclear war was

They should have looked at it from the Soviet perspective.  They feared that it would be used to defend the US from the effects of the US launching a first strike against the fUSSR, effectively ensuring that any Soviet counter-strike would be defeated.

Correct, and they were paranoid: They felt that we could attack at any moment.  This only reinforces their opinion.  Us telling them that we're doing it to protect ourselves and save lives rather than avenge them fell on deaf ears.

This would increase the already existing first strike imperative which existed in the strategic balance to the point where it would be impossible to resist.  Basically, the Soviets would need to strike first, before SDI was operational, otherwise their strategic defences would be rendered pointless at a single stroke.

And they were planning on developing ICBM's allegedly with bio/chemical warheads.

Nuclear Strategy is, at the best of times a strange beast, full of numerous contradictions and twists and turns.  It used to send my head around the bend when I studied it.  It is very hard to explain it to others who don't understand the language and the nuances, who think in straight lines rather than wibbly-wobbly ones. 

Correct.

[rickshaw]

Rickshaw

That was only part of the justification.  The Soviet economy was a wreck and basically had been since the mid-1950s.  It was really the spending on conventional defence which brought the whole crumbling edifice down, if anything.

Conventional defense brought them down?

Yes, because it skewed their economy towards defence, away from the civilian economy - they had to produce more and more numbers of weapons, as well as increasingly sophisticated ones and their economy couldn't sustain that.  Nuclear weapons were actually cheaper because you didn't need as many.   Which is why Kruschev loved them so much.

The problem with SDI was that it had the potential to destabilise an already fragile balance.  I don't doubt Reagan genuinely believed it was a purely defensive system.

It would seem that he wanted to use it for that purpose, whether he realized it could be used offensively or not.  The Day After really screwed him up and showed him how flawed the mentality on nuclear war was

It made him realise that nuclear war was essentially unwinnable.  Something the leaders of the fUSSR had worked out decades earlier.   There really needs to be a good psychological study of the US leadership during the Cold War.  Everybody thinks the Soviets were crazy but from my reading, it was really the US leaders who were fruitloops.  From leMay through, there were some seriously strange people who rose the ranks in the US military and government.

They should have looked at it from the Soviet perspective.  They feared that it would be used to defend the US from the effects of the US launching a first strike against the fUSSR, effectively ensuring that any Soviet counter-strike would be defeated.

Correct, and they were paranoid: They felt that we could attack at any moment.  This only reinforces their opinion.  Us telling them that we're doing it to protect ourselves and save lives rather than avenge them fell on deaf ears.

Not deaf ears, they just didn't believe it.  They, and the US believed each other's hawkish rhetoric.  When Americans declared it was better to "dead than red", the Soviets had no way of knowing if it was true or not.  When the Russians declared they would "bury us", the Americans believed it as well, having no way of knowing if it was true or not (and now there are serious doubts that it was actually translated correctly).  The result was each other feeding off the other and everybody becoming more and more scared that they would have to actually defend against the other side's first strike.   Always remember, the Soviets though, had actually relinquished first strike - something the Americans, still paranoid about the possibility of another Pearl Harbor did not believe, whereas the Americans have never relinquished first strike, which the Soviets, still paranoid about the possibility of another Barbarossa, believed meant they'd all be killed.

This would increase the already existing first strike imperative which existed in the strategic balance to the point where it would be impossible to resist.  Basically, the Soviets would need to strike first, before SDI was operational, otherwise their strategic defences would be rendered pointless at a single stroke.

And they were planning on developing ICBM's allegedly with bio/chemical warheads.

Supposedly.  I've never seen any confirmation of this claim, even in the post-Cold War books which closely examined the fUSSR's chemical and biological complex. Anyway, the practical difficulties would have been immense.   Designing even SRBM with biological/chemical warheads was difficult - there was no guarantee that the agents would survive.  The conditions on re-entry for an ICBM were much harder and most biological/chemical agents are actually quite fragile.

[KJ_Lesnick]

Yes, because it skewed their economy towards defence, away from the civilian economy

And the reason we didn't implode was because we had a better economy?

Nuclear weapons were actually cheaper because you didn't need as many.   Which is why Kruschev loved them so much.

I didn't know Khruschev was a huge fan of nukes -- merely that the Russians developed lots of 'em.

It made him realise that nuclear war was essentially unwinnable.  Something the leaders of the fUSSR had worked out decades earlier.   There really needs to be a good psychological study of the US leadership during the Cold War.  Everybody thinks the Soviets were crazy but from my reading, it was really the US leaders who were fruitloops.

That's kind of a hunch I had for awhile -- I didn't really want to say it

Not deaf ears, they just didn't believe it.  They, and the US believed each other's hawkish rhetoric.  When Americans declared it was better to "dead than red", the Soviets had no way of knowing if it was true or not.  When the Russians declared they would "bury us", the Americans believed it as well, having no way of knowing if it was true or not (and now there are serious doubts that it was actually translated correctly).  The result was each other feeding off the other and everybody becoming more and more scared that they would have to actually defend against the other side's first strike.

Yeah... so it built up and up and got crazier and crazier...

Always remember, the Soviets though, had actually relinquished first strike - something the Americans, still paranoid about the possibility of another Pearl Harbor did not believe

When was this?

Supposedly.  I've never seen any confirmation of this claim, even in the post-Cold War books which closely examined the fUSSR's chemical and biological complex. Anyway, the practical difficulties would have been immense.   Designing even SRBM with biological/chemical warheads was difficult - there was no guarantee that the agents would survive.

It was cooled...