Miles M.52

[Zen]

The tenure of the posts suggested it.

If I have put words into your mouth then accept my appologies, but I will not apllogise for saying that canceling the Miles M.52 was a bad move that was damaging to us.

It needs to be forcefully put that such decisions have done more harm than good, to make it clear we should avoid such idiocy in future. The more it is suggested by implication that everything was 'fine' or the 'best of all possible outcomes' the more ground is prepared for more such decisions that will cost us even more.

Part of a lineage of bad decisions, stretching to this very day.

[jcf]

The tenure of the posts suggested it.

If I have put words into your mouth then accept my appologies, but I will not apllogise for saying that canceling the Miles M.52 was a bad move that was damaging to us.

It needs to be forcefully put that such decisions have done more harm than good, to make it clear we should avoid such idiocy in future. The more it is suggested by implication that everything was 'fine' or the 'best of all possible outcomes' the more ground is prepared for more such decisions that will cost us even more.

Part of a lineage of bad decisions, stretching to this very day.

Where I did not agree that the cancellation was foolish? What I disagree with is the notion that it was the best thing since sliced bread and somehow would have catapulted Britain way beyond everybody else...it would have been useful just as the X-1 was useful, for research. However both designs were already being eclipsed by what the engineers had on the board and in the prototype sheds...nothing exists in a vaccum.

Britain's biggest problem was not one of technology, rather it was that none of the governments...Conservative or Liberal, seemed to have a grasp of what was available or what was needed and seemed incapable of defining a policy and a focus. Wood's Project Cancelled and other writings make that painfully clear. The British aviation industry also played a major role in the whole mess.

I wonder what would have happened if the RAE and the other advanced research organizations had been combined into a single entity and setup with the resources and support of the NACA or later NASA...this was finally done but not until the 1990s.

[Zen]

A good question that.

However politics intervene, and noware more prominently than Suez and its aftermath. If I was looking for a point in time where the most damage was done, that would be it. Not that some of D.Sandys work was wrong, but the scale of cancelations and the quick fix solutions where what set us up for more disasters in the 60's and onwards.

Consider three of the projects 'killed'. SR177 and the Detla III.
In each case the machines would have evolved over time from then, and in each had potential beyond the narrow scope of their orrigins to fulfill a number of roles.

Its clear to see that the Delta III could have offered a Canberra replacement in medium to high altitude operations, and by this driven a simpler and more affordable solution to the low level strike requirement. Though its hard to see the RAF opting for the Buccaneer and they might still seek F111's
The SR.177 equaly has potential to evolve into a cheaper to operate fighter than the Lightning and a potential alternative the Jaguar after the P1154 business(cheaper I suspect than the Jaguar). Its lifespan might well near match that of the Etandard.

The Red Hebe AAM, is clearly a technical nightmare, but one that is resolvable if they take the step of removing the terminal ARH components which they never got to work with the SARH. A greater amount of knowledge would have been gained on guided missiles and of benfit to other projects I suspect.

The consequences of that are to delay some decisions into the 60's and 70's when more is known about whats needed, and to undrmine the drive for the 'quick fix' as it was F4 Phantom II. A delay that might have forced some more rational thinking on naval aviation.

But the big casaulty seems to be the Medium Fleet CV.

[Archibald]

The Red Hebe AAM, is clearly a technical nightmare, but one that is resolvable if they take the step of removing the terminal ARH components which they never got to work

Very interesting coment! I heard that they tested some rounds on a Canberra... EE even proposed a fighter Canberra with the system.

[Zen]

That was Red Dean.

Red Dean and Red Hebe where based on the same missile body from Vickers.
However Red Dean was to use a PD and Red Hebe a CW SARH guidance. I understand both where to then, at around 4nm from target, switch to ARH (active homing) using a X-band set onboard the missile (the same as was to be used on Green Cheese), and that is the heart of the technical problems Vickers had with the project. Switching from SARH to ARH, this and arguments over weather the missile needed to be locked on before launch.
Dummy rounds where flown on a Canberra, but not on the wingtip, not sure how far they got with it all in testing.

Industry was effectively of one voice that the 16ft long 1,330lb missile was too large and draggy. Under this pressure Vickers did sketch a scaled down version, at 675lb in weight. Its that scaled weapon you can see on the wingtips of the P1103 model Camn had in his office, pictured in Tony Butlers book. Its roughly 13-14ft long.

All this was the product of Red Hawk, an ealier attempt to produce a all-aspect missile.

[Archibald]

I understand both where to then, at around 4nm from target, switch to ARH (active homing) using a X-band set onboard the missile (the same as was to be used on Green Cheese), and that is the heart of the technical problems Vickers had with the project. Switching from SARH to ARH, this and arguments over weather the missile needed to be locked on before launch.

Very, very interesting comment! Thanks for the info!!!