Panzer IV

[dy031101]

dy, you wouldn't happen to have any pictures or source for them would you?

Here is a mockup picture.

[dy031101]

Achtung Panzer website does say that there was an attempt to mount a "narrow turret" from the Panther onto a Panzer IV, an exercise which "overburndens the chassis".

Regarding the 'narrow turret' there was a suggestion at mounting the Panther Ausf F's 'schmalturm' onto Pz IV chassis for some reason or other.  Seems a bit odd to me though, given the IV was definitely old-school in comparison to the Panther.

Would this one have been able to handle the Schmalturm?

[rickshaw]

Actually they weren't (similar) in roles.  The Panzer IV was designed to fulfil a similar role to the British Infantry Tank or the Soviet "breakthrough tank" - support the infantry onto the objective and destroy obstacles while protecting them from enemy tanks.  The Panzer III was always intended to be employed as an exploitation vehicle, rather as the US and UK meant their cavalry/cruiser tanks to be utilised. <...>

If you look back a couple of posts you will find that that's precisely what I wrote. I said they were similar in capabilities, not in roles. Or at least so similar that going for two designs seems pointless.

Capabilities are not roles.

[rickshaw]

What most people forget is that the Germans actually built their own doctrine on British practice.  Guderian's first manual on Panzer warfare was in fact a direct translation of the British Army's "Purple Primer" - the training pamphlet that was written after the first experiments with the Mechanized Force in the late 1920s (named after the colour of its cover).

It's true, but whereas the British went off the deep end with their "tanks as ship fleets on land" due to the influences of Fuller, Liddell Hart, and Hobart, the Germans kept a very good notion of "combined arms" in their thinking.  Blitzkrieg was just proven tactics with added mobility and new equipment.  The British concept of armored warfare (and subsequent rewriting of Blitzkrieg) looked more like naval warfare on land or a totally new kind of fighting.

Paddy Griffith does a very good job of dispelling this myth in very short order in his recent Osprey title on Desert Tactics.

Last one we'll see from Paddy I fear.  Paddy unfortunately also had a bit of a reputation for starting out with a preconception and then building on it.  His works on WWI were excellent and broke new ground but I rather suspect he went the wrong way with this.  I'll have to read it before I make any other comment though.

See a preview of that here.

Blitzkrieg wasn't British ideas with a German spin.  It was a different route altogether.  They may have started in the same place, but one went right and the other went left when they came to a fork in the road.  They were not parallel concepts and that is clearly shown by the way the competing theories played out completely differently on the battlefield.

Cheers,

Logan

Here I fear we must differ.  Blitzkrieg was indeed British ideas with a German spin.  The British unfortunately placed their emphasis, in light of their Great War experience on the use of artillery to achieve their objective whereas the Germans utilised artillery, combined with armour.   German artillery fire control anyway, lagged well behind the British and continued to do so for the entire war.   Their ability though, to combine what they did have with other arms was excellent, no doubt about it but I rather suspect that was because they weren't as bound by their regimental system as the British were.   Unfortunate but true.  One of the British army's greatest strength was also its greatest weakness.

[ChernayaAkula]

If you look back a couple of posts you will find that that's precisely what I wrote. I said they were similar in capabilities, not in roles. Or at least so similar that going for two designs seems pointless.

Capabilities are not roles.

Obviously!
For the third time, that was my point all along. They were designed for different roles, but the resulting designs had very similar capabilities. Or at east so similar that it seems futile to procure two designs, when both jobs could've been done better by one of the designs, simplifying logistics, training and further development.

[Logan Hartke]

See a preview of that here.

Blitzkrieg wasn't British ideas with a German spin.  It was a different route altogether.  They may have started in the same place, but one went right and the other went left when they came to a fork in the road.  They were not parallel concepts and that is clearly shown by the way the competing theories played out completely differently on the battlefield.

Here I fear we must differ.  Blitzkrieg was indeed British ideas with a German spin.  The British unfortunately placed their emphasis, in light of their Great War experience on the use of artillery to achieve their objective whereas the Germans utilised artillery, combined with armour.   German artillery fire control anyway, lagged well behind the British and continued to do so for the entire war.   Their ability though, to combine what they did have with other arms was excellent, no doubt about it but I rather suspect that was because they weren't as bound by their regimental system as the British were.   Unfortunate but true.  One of the British army's greatest strength was also its greatest weakness.

I agree that German artillery generally lagged behind in WWII, but the story of British offensive doctrine in WWII was not the story of artillery, certainly not in the desert war, especially.  That was the whole point of Jock Columns.  That's why they were invented.  The tanks in the 7th Armoured would sally forth to meet the enemy, leaving all other arms (artillery included) behind to sit on their hands.  Jock Columns was the utilization of all those leftover bits (artillery included) to effectively combat the Germans, often more effectively than the armor that formed the backbone of the division.  They lacked the tanks and concentration of the German formations, so were inferior when going head to head, however.  If the British had used artillery to greater effect in the desert, the 50mm PaK and 88mm FlaK guns wouldn't have racked up the ridiculous kills that they did.  Dismounted infantry and artillery and the bane of AT guns and the British showed that they didn't know how to properly use either in mobile warfare in North Africa.  In set-piece attacks through minefields or on the defensive, British infantry and artillery were second to none.  British doctrine and battlefield use of infantry and artillery in a mobile, combined-arms assault (something the Germans called "Blitzkrieg") was far behind the Germans, however.

Based on British experience and advice, the US organized along the very tank-heavy British lines when organizing their own Armored Divisions.  It wasn't long before the US realized that the British had it wrong and the Germans had it right and we developed a more balanced Armored Division organization based on their lines.  The Germans eventually forgot what they knew and developed the Panzer Brigades...which failed miserably.  They lacked the mobile infantry and artillery to support them, just like the British and early American armored formations before them.

If you look back a couple of posts you will find that that's precisely what I wrote. I said they were similar in capabilities, not in roles. Or at least so similar that going for two designs seems pointless.

Capabilities are not roles.

Obviously!
For the third time, that was my point all along. They were designed for different roles, but the resulting designs had very similar capabilities. Or at east so similar that it seems futile to procure two designs, when both jobs could've been done better by one of the designs, simplifying logistics, training and further development.

That's true, but don't be too harsh on the Germans.  The Germans were soon forced down this path because of the PzKpfw III's shortcomings.  This lesson was something that the British and Russians only learned because of failed infantry tank designs.  The Americans only standardized on one type due to budget issues before the war ever started, it's not like they were doctrinally ahead by any means.  In almost every case, countries eventually decided upon the "Universal Tank" or "Main Battle Tank" due to circumstance, not visionary thinking.

Cheers,

Logan

[Jacques Deguerre]

Ooooo Kay, then. Trying to return to the theme of "what would you do?" here are my ideas.

A more angular hull and glacis, similar to the US M18 Hellcat or even the post-war Leopard A1.
A strengthened Pz. III style torsion bar suspension. (Keeping in mind the maintenance, technological and metallurgical issues previously hashed out here and elsewhere.)
New turret similar to the "down scaled Tiger 2 design" seen on the Edelweiss tank from the video game and anime Valkyria Chronicles. By this, I don't mean putting a Tiger 2 turret on a Pz. IV but using a smaller, lighter armored item with a similar design. Depending on era you wished to model, some sort of long 75 mm gun would be the most likely weapon to use.
Some sort of vaguely Panther/ Tiger 2 detailing on the engine deck.

Please keep in mind that all of this stuff is strictly aesthetic and conjectural, intended to give a model a different but still recognizable appearance. Whether any of it would be practical, desirable or necessary in real world terms is arguable but not worth collectively beating heads against a wall over. It certainly isn't outside the realm of possibility given the technology of the era, unlike say using late 20th- early 21st century features on a WW2 tank.

[dy031101]

Interesting what-if: Panzer IV Ausf. K with simplified turret.

=========================================================================

From what I believe I've learned here so far:

A more angular hull and glacis, similar to the US M18 Hellcat or even the post-war Leopard A1.  

After the T-34, slope armours would be all the rage- but to achieve the effect you want, I'd suggest mounting the sprocket drive on the same end of the chassis with the engine.  Don't know how much of the Panzer IV's drivetrain would have been left over after making that conversion.

A strengthened Pz. III style torsion bar suspension. (Keeping in mind the maintenance, technological and metallurgical issues previously hashed out here and elsewhere.)

Out of necessity, you'll see the overlapping roadwheels used by Tiger I (late model) and II.

New turret similar to the "down scaled Tiger 2 design" seen on the Edelweiss tank from the video game and anime Valkyria Chronicles. By this, I don't mean putting a Tiger 2 turret on a Pz. IV but using a smaller, lighter armored item with a similar design. Depending on era you wished to model, some sort of long 75 mm gun would be the most likely weapon to use.

Most of the turret aft of gun mantlet would be welded (single continuous curved pieces seen on the Edelweiss would be on your DIY tank formed by multiple flat pieces).

KwK 40 is a versatile piece.  KwK 42 lets you better cope with Allied heavy tanks (at the expense of lethality against fortifications)- I wonder how much weight having a lowered-silhouette could save (Panzer IV as it was could not handle the Schmalturm turret).

Some sort of vaguely Panther/ Tiger 2 detailing on the engine deck.

Need to be made to at least late-model Panther standard- early model Panther is very prone to engine fire.

[jcf]

A strengthened Pz. III style torsion bar suspension. (Keeping in mind the maintenance, technological and metallurgical issues previously hashed out here and elsewhere.)

Out of necessity, you'll see the overlapping roadwheels used by Tiger I (late model) and II.

Ummm, Why?? No other country bothered with the overly complex interleaved wheel design.

The Germans really needed to learn the KISS* principle.


* Keep It Simple Stupid

[dy031101]

Ummm, Why?? No other country bothered with the overly complex interleaved wheel design.

It is complex, but he wants to stick with torsion bars and WWII Germany's metallurgical issues, which is why they went the way they did when designing medium tanks of a new weight class, no?

Actually, maybe not if he can stick within 23~35-ton range......

[Jacques Deguerre]

Actually, that New Connection conversion is really close to what I had in mind.

Keep in mind, this is a What If so I'm coming at this thought experiment from an "aesthetic but plausible" point of view. My version of the "ideal" Pz. IV would keep the suspension of the III or IV partially as an identifying characteristic. Same thing with the front mounted transmission/ drive sprocket system; no reason you couldn't have a rear mounted version if that's what you wanted. I'd rather save the rear drive and interleaved road wheels (if used at all) for a later, Panther-like vehicle, based on the T-34 and Daimler Benz version of VK3002. Possibly, an even later vehicle could be modeled that is closer to the E-10 and E-25, although that's all outside the realm of this particular discussion.

OK, being an Allied armor guy, I've pretty much taxed out my brain capacity for German subjects at the moment. I'll have to take a break from this discussion and maybe come back later!

[dy031101]

Inspired by the Panzer IV experiment with the Schmalturm turret: could the Germans have gotten away with instead fitting the KwK-42 into the existing (or the proposed simplified) turret?  Or is the newer gun really heavier than I imagined?

[jcf]

http://henk.fox3000.com/pz4.htm (Thanks for the site reminder Lee  )

Scroll down to the Krupp proposal with enlarged road wheels, makes more sense than MAN's interleaved wheels.

[rickshaw]

See a preview of that here.

Blitzkrieg wasn't British ideas with a German spin.  It was a different route altogether.  They may have started in the same place, but one went right and the other went left when they came to a fork in the road.  They were not parallel concepts and that is clearly shown by the way the competing theories played out completely differently on the battlefield.

Here I fear we must differ.  Blitzkrieg was indeed British ideas with a German spin.  The British unfortunately placed their emphasis, in light of their Great War experience on the use of artillery to achieve their objective whereas the Germans utilised artillery, combined with armour.   German artillery fire control anyway, lagged well behind the British and continued to do so for the entire war.   Their ability though, to combine what they did have with other arms was excellent, no doubt about it but I rather suspect that was because they weren't as bound by their regimental system as the British were.   Unfortunate but true.  One of the British army's greatest strength was also its greatest weakness.

I agree that German artillery generally lagged behind in WWII, but the story of British offensive doctrine in WWII was not the story of artillery, certainly not in the desert war, especially.  That was the whole point of Jock Columns.  That's why they were invented.  The tanks in the 7th Armoured would sally forth to meet the enemy, leaving all other arms (artillery included) behind to sit on their hands.  Jock Columns was the utilization of all those leftover bits (artillery included) to effectively combat the Germans, often more effectively than the armor that formed the backbone of the division.  They lacked the tanks and concentration of the German formations, so were inferior when going head to head, however.  If the British had used artillery to greater effect in the desert, the 50mm PaK and 88mm FlaK guns wouldn't have racked up the ridiculous kills that they did.  Dismounted infantry and artillery and the bane of AT guns and the British showed that they didn't know how to properly use either in mobile warfare in North Africa.  In set-piece attacks through minefields or on the defensive, British infantry and artillery were second to none.  British doctrine and battlefield use of infantry and artillery in a mobile, combined-arms assault (something the Germans called "Blitzkrieg") was far behind the Germans, however.

Again, I fear we must differ.  The British army did not have a doctrine, indeed only adopted the concept in the 1970s under the pressure of from NATO.   Before that, it had best what could be described as an "ethos".  Within that ethos, at the time of the outbreak of WWII, indeed it was artillery which was the major arm.  Something the Armoured Corps forgot in the Desert and which Montgomery reminded them of when he took over and utilised so successfully at first and second Alamein.  The artillery commanders were always bemoaning the failure to concentrate their guns and prevent the creation of "penny-packetism".  However the defeats at Gazala and after had forced the "penny-packetism" of the Jock Columns on 8th Army because of the loss of most of the armour which as you note, had been squandered on swans "into the blue".  It took a new commander in the form of Montgomery who both had the drive and knew his head was on the chopping block if he failed to produce results to force concentration on his subcommanders.   From that grew Montgomery's "Colossal Cracks" which he refined in NW Europe.

This concentration on artillery is also why the Infantry Tanks were created with what was primarily an AT weapon rather than a large calibre HE thrower.  Artillery was intended to destroy enemy strong points, the "I" tanks were intended to protect the infantry against fast moving tanks, something which indirect artillery was not well suited to destroying.

In the Desert, the local commanders attempted to respond to Rommels use of armour with their own armour but it was handled badly and that resulted in its loss in disproportionate numbers.   When all that was left was artillery, the British made the best use they could of it, to counter tanks but that meant it needed to be on the spot, not concentrated to the rear where it could be used most effectively with the consequent creation of the "Jock" Columns.

Based on British experience and advice, the US organized along the very tank-heavy British lines when organizing their own Armored Divisions.  It wasn't long before the US realized that the British had it wrong and the Germans had it right and we developed a more balanced Armored Division organization based on their lines.  The Germans eventually forgot what they knew and developed the Panzer Brigades...which failed miserably.  They lacked the mobile infantry and artillery to support them, just like the British and early American armored formations before them.

This of course ignores that the British also modified their organisations as the war progressed and experience taught them the need for more balanced forces.  After El Alamein this was particularly evident.  With the result that the 8th Army which was up till that point very much a free-wheeling almost completely separate formation came much more under the control of the home army as far as organisations and establishments went.  Again, an aspect of Montgomery's assumption of command which has not been fully appreciated IMO.

[NARSES2]

Again, I fear we must differ.  The British army did not have a doctrine, indeed only adopted the concept in the 1970s under the pressure of from NATO.   Before that, it had best what could be described as an "ethos".  Within that ethos, at the time of the outbreak of WWII, indeed it was artillery which was the major arm.  Something the Armoured Corps forgot in the Desert and which Montgomery reminded them of when he took over and utilised so successfully at first and second Alamein.  The artillery commanders were always bemoaning the failure to concentrate their guns and prevent the creation of "penny-packetism".  However the defeats at Gazala and after had forced the "penny-packetism" of the Jock Columns on 8th Army because of the loss of most of the armour which as you note, had been squandered on swans "into the blue".  It took a new commander in the form of Montgomery who both had the drive and knew his head was on the chopping block if he failed to produce results to force concentration on his subcommanders.   From that grew Montgomery's "Colossal Cracks" which he refined in NW Europe.


This of course ignores that the British also modified their organisations as the war progressed and experience taught them the need for more balanced forces.  After El Alamein this was particularly evident.  With the result that the 8th Army which was up till that point very much a free-wheeling almost completely separate formation came much more under the control of the home army as far as organisations and establishments went.  Again, an aspect of Montgomery's assumption of command which has not been fully appreciated IMO.

I'm not qualified to get involved with the technical issues raised in this thread but my reading of WWII would support Rickshaws statements about Montgomery's impact in particular.Prior to him arriving the 8th Army has always given me the impression of behaving a bit like the "old" Indian Army and going its own way.