What if the USAAF remained under the control of the U.S Army post-1947?

[MAD]

Initially part of the United States Army, the USAF (United States Air Firce) was formed as a separate branch of the military on 18 September 1947 under the National Security Act of 1947.
For longer than I can remember, I can not but wonder how different the 'Orbat' of the structure and types of aircraft and roles that may have been developed or put into service if the USAF had not been made a separate branch and remaind under the control of the US Army and the USAAF (United States Army Air Force).
One thing is for certain – the rediculous and costly interserves rivaly, which the USAF contributed greatly too after its conception, would have been somewhat contained only to the US Army and US Navy!
After all the years of reading about everything military, I can not but help see at times the history of the USAF as being a somewhat paranoud service which at all costs attempted to garentee its purpose of being by attempting to grab and control every type of role and project it could – so oftern than not in battle with the other services – the USN and US Army!

The Johnson-McConnell agreement of 1966, does not aquire - the Army not needing to relinquished its fixed wing aircraft to the USAF in exchange for an end to restrictions on Army rotary wing operations!

Does this mean that the US Navy would have built a fleet of the USS United States super carriers in the late 1940's/ early 1950's, without the massive fight of the USAF to gain control of the United States primary nuclear delivery service – with their push to have the Convair B-36 Peacemaker put into production and service in direct compatition with the US Navy!
Does this mean the the likes and capability of the USS United States type carrier(s) could have been operating against North Korea, during the Korean War! (were as the B-36 was never used in anger during its career!!).

Would the US Army more easerly reliquished the interservice race to develop and field nuclear armed ballistic missiles to the US Navy – relying more on its intercontanental bombers to carry their share of the nuclear delivery burden (would the US Army see the flexability of the intercontanental bomber as a more flexable and more multi-purpose system – which could be used in support of its ground operations, when not dropping 'city killer'!)

Would the USN be allowed to develop its SLBM/SSBM's arsonel as the prim United States nuclear deterent in place of the likes of the Atlas IRBM, Tritan ICBM and later Minuteman ICBM's?

How would have the USAAF looked through the post-WWII to today if it was still a branch (and subordanate to!!) of the United States Army?

For starters I envisage a far greater emphisis on TAC Air – battlefield interdiction, close air support, ground attack – from aircraft more suited to rough-field operations (STOL), than that of long concrete approns.
I envisage the likes of the P1127 / AV-8A/C and later AV-8B being utilized far more in direct support of Army ground formations – from forward and makeshift operating bases!
We may even have seen the Hawker (/ Northrop or McDonnell Douglas) P1154 in service in large numbers with the U.S. Army!

Would we have seen the U.S Army pushing for the development resolve of the     turboprop engine, so that it could get the capability (in both lift and range capability) of the Douglas XC-132 strategic transport aircraft!!

Would we have seen a far greater force of airborne Army units and specialized equipment and weapons (more like that of the Soviet style Airborne Forces!), seeing that the U.S Army had control and purchase of large strategic airlift capability – this could have lead to a far greater range of purpose designed and built specialized light armoured vehicles, airborne artillery, airborne assault tanks etc.....

Would the U.S Army have fought harder to get the 'Boeing' designed C-5 Galaxy, which the Army wanted – over that of the Lockheed designed C-5 Galaxy, which the politicians chose?

Would the U.S. Army pushed so hard for the promotion of the 'Bomber Gap', that they thought the Soviets were closing – some say this was a USAF (SAC) made allusion – so as to justify their own bomber increase (in numbers and research) and that of Air Defence Commands interceptor programs and greater numbers!
Would this mean that the costly 'Century'-series of specialized interceptors may never have happened! – the likes of the McDonnell F-101, Convair F-102, Republic F-103, Convair F-106, North American F-108, and the Lockheed YF-12!

I would hope that the U.S Army puts more effort and attention into its own organic ground-based air defence – mobile SAM's and SPAAG's etc...........to support their ground formations!

The continued development and service entry of the Lockheed AH-56 Cheyenne – hopefully further developed into a two-engine derivitive

The adoption of the Sikorsky S-67 Blackhawk in the U.S. Army to become the 'American-Hind'.

Many more – either Fairchild A-10's or Northrop A-9's put into service to support the ground forces in CAS and tank killing in conjunction with the AH-56 Cheyenne!
(Thankfully I can not see the U.S. Army wanting to kill or pre-maturely wanting to phase out this excellent, purpose-designed and built aircraft, as has the USAF since the program was started!!!!)

And of course there would be the likes of the excellent deHavilland Canada DHC-4 Caribou (C-7), in far greater numbers, which themselves would eventually be replaced by the more modern turboprop derivative – the deHavilland Canada DHC-5 Buffalo (C-7A / C-8A)

I see the likes of the 'specialized' Douglas A4D-2N Skyhawk, which was developed for spacific US Army requirements to operate from makeshift forward bases (twin-wheel low pressure tyre main landing gear etc....) being put into service as a battlefield interdiction / ground attack platform.

I see the U.S. Army pushing through more purposefly with the Advanced Medium STOL Transport (AMST) compatition – selecting and putting into production either the
Boeing YC-14 or the McDoneel Douglas YC-15, as a replacement for the venrable and hard worked Lockheed C-130 Hercules.

The U.S. Army may have been more inclined to push ahead with the Light Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft (LARA) program (as the USAF was uninterested in COIN, let alone a specialized COIN aircraft.)
– either adopting the NA OV-10 Bronco or a proposed derivitive of the Grumman OV-1 Mohawk – in the form of the tandem-seat Grumman Model 134R


'I am just putting out there'!
Will be interested to see what else the Forum members can come up with.
I will especialy be waiting to see some interesting 'What If' profiles


M.A.D

[Weaver]

Forgive my editing, but what I've done is re-order your points into Strategic, CAS and Transport groups because many replies relate to multiple questions.

One thing is for certain – the rediculous and costly interserves rivaly, which the USAF contributed greatly too after its conception, would have been somewhat contained only to the US Army and US Navy!

After all the years of reading about everything military, I can not but help see at times the history of the USAF as being a somewhat paranoud service which at all costs attempted to garentee its purpose of being by attempting to grab and control every type of role and project it could – so oftern than not in battle with the other services – the USN and US Army!

Nail on the head: the Army and Navy have well-defined and understood roles with little cross-over, while the Air Force's roles heavily overlap both, leading to endless "turf wars". Just about the only "uniquely airforce" missions are strategic bombing, strategic recce, and the national air defence neccessary to prevent other nations doing them to you. However the USAAF showed in in WWII that it was perfectly capable of organising a strategic bombing effort, so there's no reason to supose this infrastructure couldn't be used as the basis for SAC-style mission from the late '40s on.

Does this mean that the US Navy would have built a fleet of the USS United States super carriers in the late 1940's/ early 1950's, without the massive fight of the USAF to gain control of the United States primary nuclear delivery service – with their push to have the Convair B-36 Peacemaker put into production and service in direct compatition with the US Navy!

Possibly, although a continuing USAAF would still have wanted the B-36 to replace it's B-50s.

Would the US Army more easerly reliquished the interservice race to develop and field nuclear armed ballistic missiles to the US Navy – relying more on its intercontanental bombers to carry their share of the nuclear delivery burden (would the US Army see the flexability of the intercontanental bomber as a more flexable and more multi-purpose system – which could be used in support of its ground operations, when not dropping 'city killer'!)

I don't think so: remember that SAC had both ICBMs and bombers, seeing them as complimentary. The US Army had a strong missile program of it's own, which started "from the bottom up" by developing battlefield missiles like Redstone and then enlarging them, whereas SAC went straight for the strategic. I think that with no SAC, you'd still see the Army missiles gradually increase in range until ICBMs became possible and bombers became one of several delivery systems, rather than the primary one. One difference I'm sure you'd see though is that all Army bombers would have, and practice, conventional capability right fom the start.

Would the USN be allowed to develop its SLBM/SSBM's arsonel as the prim United States nuclear deterent in place of the likes of the Atlas IRBM, Tritan ICBM and later Minuteman ICBM's?

Yes: the triad of bombers, ICBMs and SLBMs are complimentary to each other rather than rivals. With '50s/'60s technology (which is when these decisions are being made):

ICBMs have range, speed and are invulnerable to defensive action, but have limited accuracy, no flexibility and are vulnerable to a first strike,

Bombers have accuracy, flexibility (in both targeting and payload) and can be recalled upto the last moment, but are slow and vulnerable to defensive action,

SLBMs are vulnerable to neither first strike nor defensive action, but are limited in range and accuracy.

Would the U.S. Army pushed so hard for the promotion of the 'Bomber Gap', that they thought the Soviets were closing – some say this was a USAF (SAC) made allusion – so as to justify their own bomber increase (in numbers and research) and that of Air Defence Commands interceptor programs and greater numbers!

They probably would. Much the same intelligence would be available and the same political and budgetary factors would apply, but it would be a straight fight between Army and Navy, the Army's point being that the Navy can't defend the continental USA or hit tragets deep inside the USSR.

Would this mean that the costly 'Century'-series of specialized interceptors may never have happened! – the likes of the McDonnell F-101, Convair F-102, Republic F-103, Convair F-106, North American F-108, and the Lockheed YF-12!

I think the in-service interceptors, F-101, F-102 and F-106, probably stopped at the right point: an F-106 is about right to defend against Badgers, Bears and Bisons. The F-103, F-108 and YF-12 would only have been neccessary if the supersonic bomber threat had actually materialised, so with a more realistic appraisal of the threat, their wasted development costs could have been avoided. Then again, there's nothing to say that the faulty intelligence/analysis that led to the perceived supersonic bomber threat wouldn't apply equally in your world. In the mid '50s, the supersonic bomber seemed certain to come about: after all, we (the West) were certainly working on them.

For starters I envisage a far greater emphisis on TAC Air – battlefield interdiction, close air support, ground attack – from aircraft more suited to rough-field operations (STOL), than that of long concrete approns.
I envisage the likes of the P1127 / AV-8A/C and later AV-8B being utilized far more in direct support of Army ground formations – from forward and makeshift operating bases!

The Johnson-McConnell agreement of 1966, does not aquire - the Army not needing to relinquished its fixed wing aircraft to the USAF in exchange for an end to restrictions on Army rotary wing operations!

The continued development and service entry of the Lockheed AH-56 Cheyenne – hopefully further developed into a two-engine derivitive

The adoption of the Sikorsky S-67 Blackhawk in the U.S. Army to become the 'American-Hind'.

Many more – either Fairchild A-10's or Northrop A-9's put into service to support the ground forces in CAS and tank killing in conjunction with the AH-56 Cheyenne!
(Thankfully I can not see the U.S. Army wanting to kill or pre-maturely wanting to phase out this excellent, purpose-designed and built aircraft, as has the USAF since the program was started!!!!)

I see the likes of the 'specialized' Douglas A4D-2N Skyhawk, which was developed for spacific US Army requirements to operate from makeshift forward bases (twin-wheel low pressure tyre main landing gear etc....) being put into service as a battlefield interdiction / ground attack platform.

The U.S. Army may have been more inclined to push ahead with the Light Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft (LARA) program (as the USAF was uninterested in COIN, let alone a specialized COIN aircraft.)
– either adopting the NA OV-10 Bronco or a proposed derivitive of the Grumman OV-1 Mohawk – in the form of the tandem-seat Grumman Model 134R

These are somewhat contradictory ideas. Yes, the USAAF would certainly have had more emphasis on CAS and BAI, but remember, they only poured money into gunship helicopters because of the Johnson-McConnell agreement. If they were allowed to operate their own fixed-wing CAS (particularly if it was STOVL), they wouldn't have been interested in gunships in the first place.

Would we have seen the U.S Army pushing for the development resolve of the     turboprop engine, so that it could get the capability (in both lift and range capability) of the Douglas XC-132 strategic transport aircraft!!

Would the U.S Army have fought harder to get the 'Boeing' designed C-5 Galaxy, which the Army wanted – over that of the Lockheed designed C-5 Galaxy, which the politicians chose?

And of course there would be the likes of the excellent deHavilland Canada DHC-4 Caribou (C-7), in far greater numbers, which themselves would eventually be replaced by the more modern turboprop derivative – the deHavilland Canada DHC-5 Buffalo (C-7A / C-8A)

I see the U.S. Army pushing through more purposefly with the Advanced Medium STOL Transport (AMST) compatition – selecting and putting into production either the
Boeing YC-14 or the McDoneel Douglas YC-15, as a replacement for the venrable and hard worked Lockheed C-130 Hercules.

Yes to all of those: they're a very logical progression. You'd probably have seen more emphasis on a REALLY heavy lift helo, equivalent to the Mi-6, too.

Would we have seen a far greater force of airborne Army units and specialized equipment and weapons (more like that of the Soviet style Airborne Forces!), seeing that the U.S Army had control and purchase of large strategic airlift capability – this could have lead to a far greater range of purpose designed and built specialized light armoured vehicles, airborne artillery, airborne assault tanks etc.....

Not initially, since in the 1950s, the emphasis was on "tripwire" forces whose engagement would lead to a rapid escalation to nuclear exchanges. The '60s emphasis on brushfire wars and the experience of Vietnam would probably start the process you describe, but the real catalyst would be the late 1960s NATO move to a Flexible Response strategy, implying an extended high-intensity conventional war in Europe. That would have required massive amounts of US Army men and materiel to be moved quickly and supported over a long period.

One political battle you might see is between the Army and Navy over how much sea transport capacity the latter should maintain in order to transport the former. The Army might be arguing for a huge transport fleet with many frigates and small ASW carriers to protect it, whilst the Navy would be trying to ring-fence funds for it's carrier battle groups and the Marines.

I would hope that the U.S Army puts more effort and attention into its own organic ground-based air defence – mobile SAM's and SPAAG's etc...........to support their ground formations!

Then again, with their own fighters to deploy, they might feel pretty much as they do now. ALL airmen's objection to grunts-with-SAMs is that they shoot at anything, including their own planes. I don't see that changing just because the airmen in question are wearing the same uniform as the grunts!

[theunknownmodeler]

It makes you wonder if the emphasis would be on Close Air Support and Strike rather than purpose built fighters for air superiority like the F-86.

I think something like SAC still would have existed and Nukes would have been held onto for as long as possible.

The A-10 and Harrier would have come around quicker.

[Geoff]

I think they would have got either the A-4C (most likley) or the Fiat-G91 (if it was built by a US contractor), and later the F-5 family. The A-1 Spad seemed to fit everyones bill for low intensity bush wars, along with the Mohawk and Bronco. The AV-8 and O/A-10 are obvious (I think). How about the CAS version of the F-16?

I did wonder if the 60's obsession with one aircraft type fitting all roles might still have occurred giving us Army F-4D's and perhaps F-111A's?