Flying Boat Strategic Bombers

[rickshaw]

I think there is a misunderstanding of what "strategic bombing" is.  Its using bomber aircraft to strategically influence the outcome of a battle/campaign/theatre of war/war.  "Strategy" is the level of planning where political objectives are fulfilled by military means.  Clausewitz summed it up the most succinctly with the maxim, "war is but politics by another means."    It doesn't matter how big the bombs are or any other factor, its where they are placed and to what effect - does it influence the war at the highest level? 

The Japanese flying boat attacks on far northern Australian cities were pinpricks but they tied down an inordinate amount of resources to counter them, so therefore they fulfilled a strategic purpose.  Pearl Harbor was a strategic attack, executed with tactical resources and the biggest bomb they dropped there was IIRC 500kg.  Taranto was a strategic attack, effectively knocking the Italian fleet out of the war and it was conducted by a handful of Stringbags. 

The British introduced BIG bombs 'cause they brutally realised that if they were going to bomb cities to gain a strategic outcome, then the most efficient way to destroy a city was to send big bombs.   Yet, it should be noted, the greater proportion of the bombs that were dropped were relatively small ones, in the 500-1,000lb range.   HC bombs knock down light structures, they don't knock down heavy ones and most European cities were built of stone and brick, not timber, so relatively difficult to demolish.  So, a bomber capable of carrying a big HC bomb could also carry multiple smaller ones instead.

[wuzak]

rickshaw, I disagree with some of what you have said.

Strategic bombing is against the enemy's economy.

Taranto was against naval assets, so wasn't strategic bombing at all, but rather tactical (against the enemy's military assets). Similarly for Pearl Harbor.

The majority of bombs dropped in WW2 were the smaller ones - both the RAF and the USAAF dropped more 500lb bombs than anything else. But that's where they diverge, somewhat.

The second most dropped bomb by the USAAF was the 100lb GP bomb, followed by the 100lb incendiary bomb and the 250lb GP bomb. I don't have the numbers with me, but I believe teh second most dropped (HE) bomb by the RAF was the 1000lb GP/MC bomb.

[rickshaw]

rickshaw, I disagree with some of what you have said.

Strategic bombing is against the enemy's economy.

No, that is what it came to mean in the thinking of many strategists in WWII and after.  "Strategic Bombing" could have any target, as long as the intention was to affect the strategic outcome of a conflict. 

Taranto was against naval assets, so wasn't strategic bombing at all, but rather tactical (against the enemy's military assets). Similarly for Pearl Harbor.

Yet the intention of both strikes was to knock the enemy fleet or at least a proportion of it, out of action - a strategic outcome.

The majority of bombs dropped in WW2 were the smaller ones - both the RAF and the USAAF dropped more 500lb bombs than anything else. But that's where they diverge, somewhat.

The second most dropped bomb by the USAAF was the 100lb GP bomb, followed by the 100lb incendiary bomb and the 250lb GP bomb. I don't have the numbers with me, but I believe teh second most dropped (HE) bomb by the RAF was the 1000lb GP/MC bomb.

Isn't that basically what I said?

[wuzak]

rickshaw, I disagree with some of what you have said.

Strategic bombing is against the enemy's economy.

No, that is what it came to mean in the thinking of many strategists in WWII and after.  "Strategic Bombing" could have any target, as long as the intention was to affect the strategic outcome of a conflict. 

From your earlier definition I would suppose that almost all bombing/aerial attacks could be construed as strategic, since they are planned and executed to try to influence the outcome of battles/campaigns/theatres of war/wars.

I suppose revenge bombings would be the case that doesn't fall under the strategic banner, but even then they can be designed to have a strategic outcome.

Taranto was against naval assets, so wasn't strategic bombing at all, but rather tactical (against the enemy's military assets). Similarly for Pearl Harbor.

Yet the intention of both strikes was to knock the enemy fleet or at least a proportion of it, out of action - a strategic outcome.

The effect of both attacks could only ever be considered short term. The case of the USN is clearer, since there was no attempt to attack the US proper, so US industry was able to build replacements. I don't know if Italy attempted to do so, but there economy was under attack, which would have made building replacement ships difficult.

quote]
The majority of bombs dropped in WW2 were the smaller ones - both the RAF and the USAAF dropped more 500lb bombs than anything else. But that's where they diverge, somewhat.

The second most dropped bomb by the USAAF was the 100lb GP bomb, followed by the 100lb incendiary bomb and the 250lb GP bomb. I don't have the numbers with me, but I believe teh second most dropped (HE) bomb by the RAF was the 1000lb GP/MC bomb.

Isn't that basically what I said?

Sorry, I was trying to reinforce your point.

USAAF attacks changed, for some targets, from (attempted) precision bombing to effectively carpet bombing. Targets such as the synthetic oil plants. The USAAF tended to use even smaller bombs than normal (100l and 250lb rather than 500lb and 1000lb) because the volume of bombs would increase the likelihood of hitting something in the sprawling plants and causing damage. The damage was more easily repaired than damage from larger bombs, so it became a race between the repairers and the bombers.

[rickshaw]

From your earlier definition I would suppose that almost all bombing/aerial attacks could be construed as strategic, since they are planned and executed to try to influence the outcome of battles/campaigns/theatres of war/wars.

Not quite.  In military thought there were, originally two levels of planning - tactical and strategic.  Since WWII, under influence from first the fUSSR and then the US militaries, a third, intermediate level - "Operational" was defined (it had previously existed but was usually considered "grand-tactical").   Tactical was the immediate battle, where troops were in contact with the enemy and concerned matters completely (or almost completely) military.  Strategic was anything beyond the battlefield and could be both political and military in nature (ie the making/breaking of alliances, vast outflanking movements by invading third nations, etc.).  As the size of battlefields increased from small areas to ever larger until they effectively encompassed ones hundreds of kilometres in length, so the term "strategic" came to encompass anything that was intended to effect matters at the national level and with both a military and a political point.   "Operational" strategy is the intermediate level - where politics and military issues intersect and is best described as, "the level where the military gives substance to political objectives in a campaign or theatre of war".

So, any bombing which occurs on or near the battlefield is considered tactical such as Close Air Support and Tactical bombing missions.  Interdiction, immediately behind the battlefield is also largely considered tactical because it is intended to immediately influence the outcome of a tactical engagement.   Interdiction missions, further back, which are intended to influence a campaign or theatre's operations are really either Operational or Strategic in nature.

Much of this, I admit is an artificial distinction but it is the definitions which were accepted in WWII and after (with Operational Strategy included).

I suppose revenge bombings would be the case that doesn't fall under the strategic banner, but even then they can be designed to have a strategic outcome.

Again one which blurs the lines.  It is strategic in that it is intended to affect the political thinking of the enemy.  To make them aware that tit-for-tat is possible and that they must show restraint in their own strategy.  Problem is, it invariably just creates a cycle of escalation until total war is reached and everything is considered a valid target.

The effect of both attacks could only ever be considered short term. The case of the USN is clearer, since there was no attempt to attack the US proper, so US industry was able to build replacements. I don't know if Italy attempted to do so, but there economy was under attack, which would have made building replacement ships difficult.

In retrospect I'd agree but at the time, the idea was that by undertaking the strike either the Italian fleet would be "bottled up", unwilling to put to sea or in the case of Pearl Harbor destroyed sufficiently so that the ability of the USA to interfere in Japanese plans was so reduced that it would be ineffective.   The Japanese believed it would gain them the advantage sufficiently so that they could present Washington with a fait accompli which it would have to accept.   The Royal Navy was correct, it did circumscribe the Italians' actions afterwards, making them most unwilling to risk their ships further.   The Japanese miscalculated badly.   Both sought a strategic outcome though.

USAAF attacks changed, for some targets, from (attempted) precision bombing to effectively carpet bombing. Targets such as the synthetic oil plants. The USAAF tended to use even smaller bombs than normal (100l and 250lb rather than 500lb and 1000lb) because the volume of bombs would increase the likelihood of hitting something in the sprawling plants and causing damage. The damage was more easily repaired than damage from larger bombs, so it became a race between the repairers and the bombers.

I would have though that the oil refineries would have been particularly susceptible to blast so ideal targets for HC "cookies".

However, while interesting in of itself, this discussion is distracting from the objective of the thread - the possible use of sea planes as strategic bombers.   The point I was making was that one should not become hung up (pun intended) about the sorts of bombs which sea planes were capable of carrying but rather the objectives of the missions which were to be undertaken.  Did the sea planes have sufficient range to strike over long distances to attack targets of strategic importance?  The obvious answer is "yes".  Would they be effective though?  Depends upon what targets were being attacked and how.  A sea plane strike from long range against Pearl Harbor could have been just as effective as the carrier strike because the key was surprise, not necessarily the weapons used by the aircraft.

[McColm]

I tried fitting floats to a C-69 Constellation, I gave up in the end. But you might have better luck than me.

[PR19_Kit]

They must have been BIG floats! I built a C-47C using the largest Aeroclub floats and they needed a 1" extension each!

Grafting the hull of a Sunderland onto the bottom of a Connie might have worked, but yet again you're into the 'Where do I carry and drop the bombs?' problem.

[Rheged]

Grafting the hull of a Sunderland onto the bottom of a Connie might have worked, but yet again you're into the 'Where do I carry and drop the bombs?' problem.

I would very much like to see someone produce a "Sunderstellation",  but  I regret that the waterproof bomb bay problem is going to be too great to overcome.

[McColm]

Try under the wings just as the PS-1 did or they could be launched like torpedoes from the nose/front end like a submarine!

[McColm]

They must have been BIG floats! I built a C-47C using the largest Aeroclub floats and they needed a 1" extension each!

Grafting the hull of a Sunderland onto the bottom of a Connie might have worked, but yet again you're into the 'Where do I carry and drop the bombs?' problem.

I tried using a pair of 1/48 scale floats.

[rickshaw]

Bombs from flying boats have been carried under the wings, on struts and in the fuselage and winched out under the wings before dropping.  I see no reason why they couldn't be dropped from the sides of fuselages, through hatches (perhaps rotating ones?).  It could be possible to have them, like the Seamaster did of being dropped from a waterproof bombbay (and loaded from a hatch in the fuselage top).

[PR19_Kit]

The Seamaster rotating bomb door was a) brilliant and b) worked but it was 10 years after the time period that the OP mentions.

They had some teething problems with keeping the bomb bay dry but it worked very well in the end. The XB-51  pioneered the idea and the P6M just waterproofed it. 

[wuzak]

The CANT Z511 was a floatplane, though not quite as big as a Connie.

http://www.simnetwork.com/gallery/albums/userpics/normal_cant.z511.jpg
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/3/3b/CantZ511%28IdroGigante%291s.jpg

[McColm]

That's what I based the Connie float plane on. I also removed the middle tail fin, added griffon engines and a pair of auxiliary jet pods from a Neptune kit. I used a plastic stand from a fellow whiffer as the landing gear was already in the up position. I must have painted this model about six times, as the layers of paint have filled in some of the glazed windows. I've used some decals to indicate cargo doors. I still haven't decided on using RAF roudels or a civie Belgium decals taken from the Airfix Bristol Superfreighter kit.

[KJ_Lesnick]

But you didn't say that.....

You're right, I should have clarified...

The Schneider Trophy racers were powered by very large engines for their time, the Rolls-Royce R Type was about the same capacity as a Griffon, but had a very short life, measured in single figures of hours, which would have been pretty useless for a strategic bomber.

So these engines were highly tweaked?

Plus the aircraft itself was TINY, almost all engine and radiator and it carried the fuel in the floats on the S-6 series aircraft. The pilot was possibly the most cramped cockpit of all time, and had to have his hands on the stick before they lowered the windshield into position!

I always thought they were fighter sized... you learn something new everyday

The bigger question might be why would they want to design such an aircraft? The strategic bomber as a concept didn't really exist until the late 30s, earlier types like the HP O/400 and the big Gothas were longer range big tactical bombers in reality and they didn't last through the 1920s.

Actually the V/1500 was supposed to be strategic bomber.  So too was the XNBLR-1 though it's range sucked.

Adding a hull to a large enough fuselage to carry a hefty bomb load makes for a BIG aeroplane, think Sunderland or Coronado, and there's always the vexed question of where do you store and drop the bombs from without water pouring in the hole when you're on the water.

1: Punching them out the side seems to work. 
2: Could you either slide or punch them out the back?
3: Regardless did the technology exist to produce a watertight bomb-bay that could open and seal shut good?

There's always the Blackburn B-20 approach, i.e. a split hull that's deep when the aircraft's on the water but shallow in flight to reduce drag:

I thought of something like that except it was for a fighter (like the depicted B.44) not a bomber.  I wasn't sure if it was realistic...