War Plan Red

[rickshaw]

When the US made plans to surprise attack the UK - War Plan Red - http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ZNBwYFOxd8

[PR19_Kit]

Somehow I find that MOST unlikely. A Whiff of a television programme perhaps?

[Steel Penguin]

nope Kit, oddly enough  the US had a whole rainbow of plans for attacking everyone during the early part of the 20th century,  its a frequent "what if" on wargames sites as it lets you go at it with period equipment without too much bother of ToE.

[Captain Canada]

Cool. And of course they were ( are ) still mad about the 1812-1815 period 

[PR19_Kit]

If that's the case, where's OUR plans for attacking THEM and getting our tea chests back?

[Martin H]

If that's the case, where's OUR plans for attacking THEM and getting our tea chests back?

Because we believe in giving the other side a sporting chance by letting them bat first old boy. 

[zenrat]

If that's the case, where's OUR plans for attacking THEM and getting our tea chests back?

There will have been one.
An amphibious assault by Canada across the Great Lakes to divert forces from the true attack which was for the Imperial Airship Corps to seize Liberty Island, pull down the French Sheila and stick up a new statue of Britannia...

I'd like to see what plans there were (if any) to retake Australia following a Japanese invasion.

[rickshaw]

Despite a lot of claims, particularly in Australia about Japanese intentions, the reality is that Japan had neither the means nor the resources to undertake a major invasion of Australia, Zenrat.  Their entire Pacific and SE Asian campaigns were run pretty much on a shoe-string as far as ground forces were concerned.  The majority of the IJA was occupied in China and what wasn't was in Manchuria, defending it against potential Soviet aggression.   The rest, about 10 divisions in total was used in the Pacific and SE Asia.

The IJA knew this and it was why in early 1942 when the Japanese had one of their rare joint planning conferences apparently the representatives from the IJA and IJN nearly came to blows over the issue of where they went after they'd conquered Malay, the NEI, Burma and the Philippines.  The IJN was all for an invasion of Australia.  The IJA, knowing how little the forces they had available and doubting the IJN's ability to sustain such an operation over such a vast distance, believing the IJN had caught "victory disease" and said so.  In the end, the decision was taken to try and "isolate" Australia and that led to Guadacanal, New Guinea and plans for various islands to the SE of those islands to be taken and airfields built.

The reality was though, that as the world is a spheroid, such a plan was never realistically going to work.  It would always be possible to bring convoys in and out of Australia through the Southern Ocean, particularly as the IJN had no commerce raiding doctrine for it's fleet of submarines (they preferred to operate them in concert with the surface fleet).

Further, any attempt to invade Australia was always going to be impossible (as it is today), because of the problems of distance.  The region of strategic importance on the continent is the SE corner, where the majority of the population resides and where all industry in those days was concentrated.   This is of course the furthest point from the nearest major Japanese bases in 1942.  So, if they were to invade they were faced with a choice - land closest to their bases, which of course means any invasion force must then traverse the considerable distance to the SE corner or land in the SE corner, which exposes the Japanese supply lines to interdiction by Allied submarines and aircraft and of course shortens the Australian supply lines considerably.

I for one would not have liked to be a IJA soldier landing in either the Top End or far Northern Queensland and then trying to advance across the continent which had few developed transportation links and what there were, would have been destroyed in an Australian "scorched earth" strategy.  Nor would I have liked to be faced by some of the most battle-hardened and experienced soldiers in the form of the AIF divisions which had just returned from the Middle-East where they had earnt the praise of friend and foe alike.  As the Battle of Khalkhin Gol had shown, the IJA was not equipped physically or mentally to face a determined mechanised foe which was experienced in manoeuvre warfare, which the AIF was.

We might have seen more Japanese raids, both air and land forces but even then, after Midway, with most of the IJN carrier fleet destroyed, it was unlikely.  Even the air raids that did occur against Darwin were pretty desultory and were intended more to tie down Allied resources, particularly aircraft than they were to actually achieve any real material destruction.   After the fall of Singapore, Darwin's importance as a fleet base had reduced considerably particularly with the capture of the NEI meaning it was exposed to the possibility of air attack.   Reaching the SE corner was of course beyond the ability of the Japanese air forces from the bases they did have, so again, their ability to strategically influence decisions in Canberra were of course quite limited.

[rickshaw]

nope Kit, oddly enough  the US had a whole rainbow of plans for attacking everyone during the early part of the 20th century,  its a frequent "what if" on wargames sites as it lets you go at it with period equipment without too much bother of ToE.

Indeed.  Most were designed more as make-work for the US forces' staffs than anything else in the difficult days of the 1920s and 1930s.  A case of "what if" than anything else.  It allowed them to practice what was required of them in their real plans.  Of the various colour plans, only Orange - against Japan was a realistic effort.  Even that though, was designed around the use of surface combatants such as battleships and cruisers and seriously lagged behind the developments of the late 1930s in the area of carrier aviation, which Taranto and Pearl Harbour had brought to reality.

That there were serious preparations was more I suspect of a disconnect between what was in the plan than what the real circumstances were.  The 1935 exercises mentioned in the programme were I understand it more a case of a bit of a subtle way to inject money into the civilian economy under Roosevelt's various anti-Depression policies, than because they seriously were considering to invade Canada.

There is a story though, that when the attack on Pearl Harbor had been announced, War Plan Orange was actually taken from the safe and was started to be implemented, until it was realised that most of the Pacific Fleet was now on the bottom of Battleship Row in Pearl and the Nazis problem complicated issues.   As it was, the US Navy always hankered to sail West and fight it out in Japanese home waters to revenge Pearl Harbor.

[rickshaw]

If that's the case, where's OUR plans for attacking THEM and getting our tea chests back?

More than likely, just as they did later in The Falklands, all the RN was intending to do was find the last set of plans (1812) they'd prepared, dust them off and use them again.  I wonder how much whitewash the US government had stockpiled? 

[zenrat]

Thanks Rickshaw.  I forgot your specialised subject!

I heard Roland Perry interviewed on the radio promoting his book "The Fight for Australia" and he said that the General who led the capture of Singapore was keen to continue onwards and attack Australia.  The Prime Minister was not keen on this but knew that if the General got to meet the emperor (it was on the cards) then the emperor would be persuaded also.  So the General was banished to Manchuria.
I can't remember any of the names (sorry) and I haven't got hold of the book yet but it sounded interesting.

[rickshaw]

That would have been Tomoyuki Yamashita, "Tiger of Malaya".  Yamashita may have wanted to "continue on" but he'd blotted his copybook a few too many times for the Imperial High Command, particularly when he'd addressed some Singaporean civilian leaders after the city had fallen and called them "citizens of Japan" (which they weren't under Imperial doctrine) and so he was exiled to Manchuria for a large part of the duration.  That may have been an excuse but I've never really studied the man all that much, I must admit.

Even if he had gotten his wish, the Japanese simply lacked the forces to undertake such a campaign, for the reasons I've already given.  China was bleeding them dry and the fear of Soviet aggression (despite the non-aggression pact) still meant they kept a large force in Manchuria (although that was steadily reduced as losses in other theatres mounted so by 1945, it was a pretty hollow force).

As it was, long term Japanese intentions were that once the "Southern thrust" was complete, they were going to attack the fUSSR.  They had their eyes on the vast mineral wealth of the Soviet Far East and wanted it badly.  They felt that the early successes of the Nazis in the Soviet Union had shown how much of a hollow tiger it was.

[PR19_Kit]

As it was, long term Japanese intentions were that once the "Southern thrust" was complete, they were going to attack the fUSSR.  They had their eyes on the vast mineral wealth of the Soviet Far East and wanted it badly.  They felt that the early successes of the Nazis in the Soviet Union had shown how much of a hollow tiger it was.

That theme keeps on coming up in modern day novels, the 'Northern Resource Area' seems a common phrase across various author's work.

[Diamondback]

As it was, long term Japanese intentions were that once the "Southern thrust" was complete, they were going to attack the fUSSR.  They had their eyes on the vast mineral wealth of the Soviet Far East and wanted it badly.  They felt that the early successes of the Nazis in the Soviet Union had shown how much of a hollow tiger it was.

That theme keeps on coming up in modern day novels, the 'Northern Resource Area' seems a common phrase across various author's work.

ISTR Coonts's Fortunes of War in particular (which had an interesting WHIF, optically-cloaked F-22s), possibly Clancy's The Bear and the Dragon too.

[NARSES2]

Yup all countries had War Plans between WWI's and II even though it had been the War to End all Wars. A cynical view is that the military had to have some enemy to ensure continued funding, the plausible one is that they were doing their duty and planning to defend the realm or republic whatever. Some of the US ones are rather odd to the modern eye (the British attack from bases in the Caribbean is one that stands out for me). Details on other countries plans can be rather more difficult to come by.

Prior to WWI as most European countries were usually involved in a war (major or minor)/getting ready for one/or getting over one there was no real need for these What If scenarios, although they were still produced to give the staff college something to do.

The US of course was involved in internal expansion/conflict until just about the turn of the century but had to keep a weather eye on Canada however implausible that was and Mexico which was perhaps slightly more plausible