Carrier Doctrine by Nation

[KJ_Lesnick]

Not sure where to put this but this seems to be the best spot

I'm curious how carrier doctrine varied from nation to nation in terms of who had the authority to implement and change tactics

• US Navy: 1922-1939
  
• US Navy: 1941-1945
  
• US Navy: 1950-1975
  
• Royal Navy: 1918-1938
  
• Royal Navy: 1939-1945
  
• Royal Navy: 1945-1975
  
• Imperial Japanese Navy: Beginning to 1931
  
• Imperial Japanese Navy: 1931-1941
  
• Imperial Japanese Navy: 1941-1945
  

[rickshaw]

US Navy - US Navy High Command
Royal Navy - the Admiralty
Imperial Japanese Navy - the Japanese High Command.

Who else do you think would have the experience, the knowledge and above all else, the authority to alter the fighting doctrine of the naval forces for those nations, Kendra/Robyn?   The Sea Scouts perhaps?   

[KJ_Lesnick]

Rickshaw

US Navy - US Navy High Command
Royal Navy - the Admiralty
Imperial Japanese Navy - the Japanese High Command.

I think you just like to single me out for ridicule: Plus, you are actually wrong.  At least with the United States Navy: While doctrine is dictated up near the top; the decision to alter tactics on the fly with carrier-aviation lied in the hands of the CO's and CAG's.

This actually gave us an advantage over the japanese.

[rickshaw]

Rickshaw

US Navy - US Navy High Command
Royal Navy - the Admiralty
Imperial Japanese Navy - the Japanese High Command.

I think you just like to single me out for ridicule: Plus, you are actually wrong.  At least with the United States Navy: While doctrine is dictated up near the top; the decision to alter tactics on the fly with carrier-aviation lied in the hands of the CO's and CAG's.

This actually gave us an advantage over the japanese.

It may have but you are confusing doctrine for tactics.  The former is why you fight the tactics you do and the latter is fighting the tactics you do.  You asked about doctrine, not tactics, Kendra/Robyn.

As to why I single you out is that you often ask the most ridiculous questions.  Normally I ignore what you say most of the time.   

[KJ_Lesnick]

But what do you call the authority to implement tactics on the fly and change them?

[rickshaw]

But what do you call the authority to implement tactics on the fly and change them?

Command.   

Kendra/Robyn, it works like this.  One day, a soldier/sailer/airman thinks up a better way to fight his enemy.  His commander listens to his suggestion and orders everybody under his command to fight that way.  His superior observes superior results and orders all his sub-commanders to fight that way.  The high command observes superior results and orders that doctrine be written about how to fight that way.  The sub-commander at the training school/college/depot receives a directive that in the future, everybody will use this doctrine to train how they will fight the enemy.  This is a constant, two way street, with information (ideally) moving in all directions at once, orders being issued and changes occurring.  Some militaries are more flexible than others.

[Logan Hartke]

Some militaries are more flexible than others.

Cheers,

Logan

[KJ_Lesnick]

Rickshaw,

Okay, so it would appear the USN was more flexible than the Imperial Japanese Navy: Correct?

With that said, how did the Royal Navy's carrier aviation flexibility compare to the US Navy and Imperial Japanese Navy during the following periods

• Royal Navy: 1920's to 1939
  
• Royal Navy: 1939 to 1945
  
• Royal Navy: 1945-1965
  

[rickshaw]

Rickshaw,

Okay, so it would appear the USN was more flexible than the Imperial Japanese Navy: Correct?

No idea, never studied it.

With that said, how did the Royal Navy's carrier aviation flexibility compare to the US Navy and Imperial Japanese Navy during the following periods

• Royal Navy: 1920's to 1939
  
• Royal Navy: 1939 to 1945
  
• Royal Navy: 1945-1965
  

Doctrinally or tactically?

I'd suggest that the RN FAA was as flexible as was needed by the situation, Kendra/Robyn.   The RN FAA at various times saw a problem and solved it to the best of their ability.  The Admiralty OTOH often was slow on the uptake and failed to solve various tactical problems because they couldn't see the need or the necessity for them to solve it.

[strilekawk]

The US Navy has a more flexible way of doing things. While there is written doctrine Battle Group commanders down to the individual pilots are given lots of leeway in their approach to a mission or problem. One of the reasons the IJN was beaten so badly was their rigidity in operational tactics and execution of a plan. They were about 30-50 years behind in their warplan believing that a grand battle between battle ships would settle the war but blew their chance at the Battle of Leyte Gulf. While they pioneered carrier tactics they failed to capitalize and maintain their advantage. The USN was able to adapt to changes in the battle environment and learn from mistakes. The RN was somewhere in the middle but closer to the USN since they were part of many operations with the US carriers.

Sadly I have watched over the years the stagnation of the Navy to the point mistakes are not tolerated to the point Jr Officers are afraid of doing anything new for fear of making a mistake and ruining their career. The idea of learning from your mistakes is a foreign concept many young leaders these days. I am proud to have been a part of the US Navy at it's best in the late 70's to late 90's. Things a Petty officer or Jr Officer in the Navy were allowed to do was significantly greater than our counterparts in the Air Force. Those days are long gone now, never to return. 

[PR19_Kit]

The RN was somewhere in the middle but closer to the USN since they were part of many operations with the US carriers.

The RN was doing 'carrier stuff' in WWII long before the USN got into that act! Viz. Norway, the Bismark, Malta etc.

[sandiego89]

Agree on the WWII USN being much more flexible than the IJN, strategically, doctrinally and tactically.  I recently read Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions by Alan D. Zimm, and he outlined the rigidity of IJN planning and execution quite well.  A good read, although I found some of his analysis to be overly picky on the Japanese.

IJN seemed to be very much "stick to the plan". 

[KJ_Lesnick]

Logan Hartke

Fantastic!


Rickshaw

Doctrinally or tactically?

Tactically...

I'd suggest that the RN FAA was as flexible as was needed by the situation, Kendra/Robyn.   The RN FAA at various times saw a problem and solved it to the best of their ability.

I'm just curious how the RN FAA compared (to the USN) from the 1920's to mid-1939 when it was under the control of the RAF, from 1939-1945 to the USN from 1935-1941 and from 1942-1945.  

I'm not talking aircraft and equipment: Merely the latitude of the Battlegroup Commanders, the Carrier Captains, and CAG's to alter tactics on the fly.  My assumption was the RAF was less flexible.


Strilehawk

The US Navy has a more flexible way of doing things. While there is written doctrine Battle Group commanders down to the individual pilots are given lots of leeway in their approach to a mission or problem . . . The RN was somewhere in the middle but closer to the USN since they were part of many operations with the US carriers.

I'm curious how they were when the RAF owned the carrier-aviation, and from mid-1939-1941 (When the Admiralty got control of aviation prior to the US entry to war).

One of the reasons the IJN was beaten so badly was their rigidity in operational tactics and execution of a plan. They were about 30-50 years behind in their warplan believing that a grand battle between battle ships would settle the war but blew their chance at the Battle of Leyte Gulf. While they pioneered carrier tactics they failed to capitalize and maintain their advantage. The USN was able to adapt to changes in the battle environment and learn from mistakes.

Adaptability is generally a strong variable in success.

Sadly I have watched over the years the stagnation of the Navy to the point mistakes are not tolerated to the point Jr Officers are afraid of doing anything new for fear of making a mistake and ruining their career. The idea of learning from your mistakes is a foreign concept many young leaders these days.

My attitude is that there are two kinds of mistakes: Forgivable mistakes -- these are the ones that are small and/or the result of battle plans not meshing up with actual events (there are known unknowns and unknown ones) which often are the kind you learn from and move on if you live; and Unforgivable mistakes -- ones that should never ever be made and show a person is fundamentally unfit for their job.

I'm not sure what your belief on this is.

I am proud to have been a part of the US Navy at it's best in the late 70's to late 90's.

After Vietnam to Clinton.

Things a Petty officer or Jr Officer in the Navy were allowed to do was significantly greater than our counterparts in the Air Force.

That doesn't surprise me at all

[rickshaw]

Rickshaw

Doctrinally or tactically?

Tactically...

I'd suggest that the RN FAA was as flexible as was needed by the situation, Kendra/Robyn.   The RN FAA at various times saw a problem and solved it to the best of their ability.

I'm just curious how the RN FAA compared (to the USN) from the 1920's to mid-1939 when it was under the control of the RAF, from 1939-1945 to the USN from 1935-1941 and from 1942-1945.  

I would suggest that both were as good as their training and doctrine allowed, Kendra/Robyn.  Neither the RN FAA or the RAF (at Sea) nor the USN was involved in any major conflict before WWII.  All simply "played it by ear".   They shined their boots and their planes and flew in formation.  You cannot compare them because they weren't facing each other or any other enemy at the time.   I would suggest that it was purely a matter of the various commanders and their environments which determined if they were flexible.

I'm not talking aircraft and equipment: Merely the latitude of the Battlegroup Commanders, the Carrier Captains, and CAG's to alter tactics on the fly.  My assumption was the RAF was less flexible.

Why?  Because they were more disciplined?  Because they were stiffer in their parade drill?  Because they flew their formations more tightly?  I'm interested on what you make such a judgement.

As someone I know once remarked, the RAF was intent on inculcating a middle-class ethic into it's officers from the day they signed the dotted line.  This meant they knew how to tie a bow-tie, which Claret should be drunk and of course how to play mess-rugger and of course, fly their aircraft.   It doesn't mean they were robots which didn't think and act appropriately to the battlefield situation, Kendra/Robyn.   

[KJ_Lesnick]

Rickshaw

Neither the RN FAA or the RAF (at Sea) nor the USN was involved in any major conflict before WWII.

There are however heirarchical set-ups that tend to indicate an ability to adapt on the fly

Why?  Because they were more disciplined?  Because they were stiffer in their parade drill?  Because they flew their formations more tightly?  I'm interested on what you make such a judgement.

My guess was that the RAF's had a more elaborate chain of command, and a more centralized hierarchy which tends to reduce the ability to operate autonomously, to implement tactics to a changing environment.

As someone I know once remarked, the RAF was intent on inculcating a middle-class ethic into it's officers from the day they signed the dotted line.

I never knew that

It doesn't mean they were robots which didn't think and act appropriately to the battlefield situation, Kendra/Robyn.   

Hey, the USAF were as centralized as they came by Vietnam: SAC was planning every operation from Omaha even despite having local air commands in the Pacific